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THE LAW OF STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS.
The decisions of the last few years in cases relating to
strikes and boycotts, and the rights of parties to industrial
disputes in the use of those weapons, show no approach to
uniformity of judicial opinion. In Allen v. Flood (1898),
A. C. i, the officers, or an officer, of a trade union in the
ship-building trade procured the discharge of certain workmen, members of another union, who were obnoxious to the
former union because they worked in iron as well as wood
and were considered 'as trespassing on the domain of the.
former union, although at the time not working on iron, by
threatening the employer with a strike unless the obnoxious
men were discharged. The discharged men sued the officer
who had been thus instrumental in getting them discharged
for damages, and the action failed by a majority vote of the
Lords, contrary to the opinion of a majority of the common
law judges, who were (by an ancient practice, seldom resorted to) summoned to attend and deliver opinions.
In Quinn v. Lcathen (i9oI), A. C. 495, a trade union in

the meat business boycotted a dealer who employed non-union
73
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men and refused to discharge them, and induced one of his
customers to stop buying of him by threatening to bring on
a strike among the customer's workmen. The Lords, by
a unanimous vote, sustained an action for damages brought
by the dealer against the officei s of the union.
\Vithout going into the details of these cases it will be
noticed that both were cases where a trade union used its
peculiar powers to compel the discharge of non-union, or
other union, men; the employer yielding in the one case, the
men suffered; the employer resisting in the other case, he
himself suffered. The injured men in the one case failed to
obtain redress, while the injured employer in the other case
succeeded.
In Massachusetts, in a case arising after Allen v. Flood
and before Quinn v. Leathcni, the Supreme Court refused
to follow Allen v. Flood, and, following the trend of some
earlier decisions in that state, held an attempt of'one trade
union to procure the discharge of members of another trade
union by threats of strike and other conduct to be illegal and
granted an injunction at the suit of imembers of the latter
against members of the former, Holmes, C. J., dissenting."
The New York Court of Appeals in a more recent case of
the same general character, decided in 1902,2 reached the
opposite result by a vote of 4 to 3, and a suit for injunction
and damages by the member of one trade union against the
members of another failed.
The general doctrine about which all the cases revolve, as
set forth, for example, in the leading case of Walker v.
Cronin, 3 is that one has a right to enjoy the fruits and ad-

vantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill, and credit,
and that, while he has no right to be protected against competition, he has a right to be protected not only against infringement of definite property rights, but against malicious
and wanton molestation or interference in his business, depriving him of opportunities for gain. That case decided
1

Plant v. W1oods, i76 Mass. 492.

"Nat. Protective Assoc. of Steam Fitters, etc., v. Cumming, 170
N. Y. 315.
a 107 Mass. 555.
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only an abstract principle, making no application of the
principle, as it arose on a demurrer to a declaration alleging
merely in general terms that the defendant did unlawfully
and without justifiable cause molest, obstruct, and hinder the
plaintiffs from carrying on their business, and, with the unlawful purpose of preventing the plaintiffs from carrying on
their business, persuaded, etc., the servants of the plaintiffs
to leave their employment, whereby the plaintiffs were put
to expense, etc., and not disclosing what the relation of the
defendants to the business was. The Court had no occasion, it is said in the opinion, to consider what would constitute justifiable cause.
It is evident that the molestation in question may be of
various kinds according to the business relations of the person molested. An employer may be molested by inducing
workmen to leave his employ or not to enter it; workmen
may be molested by inducing the empioyer to discharge, or
not to employ, them; a dealer may be molested by inducing
customers not to buy of him, or other dealers not to buy of
or sell to him; a manufacturer, carrier, or dealer may be
molested by inducing other parties, or their servants, to refuse
to handle, or work on, goods or materials coming from him.
It must be noted that the prohibition against interfering
in another's business, by inducing third persons not to deal
with him, does not prohibit such third persons from refusing
to deal. It is lawful for the workman to strike; his right to
do so is undoubted and unqualified, assuming, of course, that
there is no contract for continued service. It is lawful for
the employer to discharge his workman, for the customer to
stop buying. What is prohibited is outside interference, inducing the workman, employer, or customer to do what he
has a legal right to do, but perhaps would not- do but for such
intervention.
When we have, instead of a single person, a body of men
exercising the right of refusing to deal, as in the case of
striking workmen, the question at once arises whether the
rule against inducing operates as between different members
of that body. Each acting separately may strike, but may
he induce others to join him? It seems that he may. That
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workmen may act in concert and strike in a body by prearrangement is admitted universally at the present day.4 We
are aware of no modem case that in terms denies this right.
One workman in such a case is not liable for inducing his
fellow-workmen to strike.
Furthermore, there is this important qualification of the
rule against interference-viz., it does not forbid " friendly
advice or free expression of opinion." This is laid down in
I1alker v. Cronin, supra, and elsewhere, and applies most
strongly in the case of a body of workmen working for a
common employer.
Going a step farther, when men are associated together in
labor unions, and strikes are conducted by the unions in the
various ways provided by the constitutions of the unions, it
is evident that the question of liability is further complicated.
The union may embrace, as usually happens, workmen of
different employers. 'It may be decided that the workmen of a particular employer, ,orof certain employers, or,of all the
employers, shall strike, and the strike may be voted,: or
ordered, by bodies which include others than the'striking
workmen, or by officers who are not themselves among the
striking workmen. Are those not striking liable for inducing the ethers to strike, or, in case of a general strike; or
strike in more than one shop, are those in one shop liable for
inducing those in another shop to strike? In other words,
does the rule in regard to a single body of workmen-i.e., the
workmen of a certain employer--extend to different bodies
united in an association? If it does, they are protected, being
treated as a unit or as entitled to advise each other. This
question is at least partly answered in the affirmative by the
authorities.
In Wabash R. R. Co. v. Hannahan, 121 Fed Rep. 563,
decided last year, it was sought to enjoin the officers of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the officers of the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen from ordering a strike,
and it was held that the defendants could not be enjoined
'See Cooke on Trade and Labor Combinations, p. 34, collecting the
cases.
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against ordering the strike because it would in effect prevent
the men from striking, which they had a right to do. So it
is said by Taft, J., in another case in the U. S. Circuit Court,5
after declaring the right of workmen to organize, and explaining the benefit thereof in enabling them to command
better prices thus than when dealing singly with employers,
and in other ways, " they have the right to appoint officers
who shall advise them as to the course to be taken by them
in their relations with their employer. They may unite with
other unions. The officers they appoint, or any other person
to whom they choose to listen, may advise them as to the
proper course to be taken by them in regard to their employment, or, if they choose to repose such authority in any
one, may order them, on pain of expulsion from their union,
peaceably to leave the employ of their employer because any
of the terms of their employment are unsatisfactory."
In a recent case, Glamorgan Coal Co. v. So. WVales Miners'
Federation (19o3), I K. B. 118, this doctrine was even ap-

plied to a case where compliance with the order to stop work
involved a breach of contract on the part of the men, but
the decision has been reversed on appeal, one of three judges
dissenting. 6
Although the right to strike, the right to stop work, which
is merely one form of a refusal to deal, is almost universally
stated to be absolute and unqualified, yet we find several cases
in the Federal courts in which the question of motive is
treated as material and as qualifying that right. In Toledo,
Ann Arbor and N. M. Ry. Co. v. Pa. Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 730
(1893), where there was a brotherhood strike of engineers
on the plaintiff's road on account of the employment there of
non-union engineers, and the engineers on the defendant's
road were refusing to haul cars received from the plaintiff's
road, an injunction was granted against the defendant company, or its employees (while continuing in the employment),
refusing to receive and to deliver interstate freight from and
to the plaintiff company. In the opinion by Taft, J., the inThomas v. Cincinnati, A\ruw Orleans and Texas Pacific Ry. Co., 62
Fed. Rep. 803, 817 (894).

'See Weekly Notes of Cases for August z5, x9o3.
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terstate commerce law is appealed to as requiring the free
interchange of interstate freight between the two roads and
as making an attempt to prevent it, or to induce others to
refuse it. a criminal conspiracy. While refusing an injunction restraining the engineers from quitting the employment
and saying that they can escape the injunction granted by so
quitting, the Court considers fully the rights and liabilities involved, and concludes that the engineers may by quitting
make themselves liable civilly in damages, and also criminally, although they cannot be enjoined from so doing, because you cannot compel by mandatory injunction the performance of personal service. " If they quit the service of
the company in execution of rule 12 (a rule of the Brotherhood requiring engineers of one road to refuse to handle cars
of a connecting road where there is a strike) in order to
procure or compel defendant companies to injure the complainant company, they are doing an unlawful act, rendering
themselves liable in damages to the complainant if any injury is thereby inflicted, and they may be incurring a criminal
penalty." 7 And this, it is explained, applies as well to a
single engineer as to a combination. Answering the argument on the other side, it is said, " But it is said that it cannot be unlawful for an employee either to threaten to quit,
or actually to quit the service, when not in violation of his
contract, because a man has the inalienable right to bestow
his labor where he will, and to withhold his labor as he will.
Generally speaking, this is true, but not absolutely. If he
uses the benefit which his labor is, or will be, to another, by
threatening to withhold it, or agreeing to bestow it, for the
purpose of inducing, procuring, or compelling that other to
commit an unlawful or criminal act, the withholding or bestowing of his labor for such purpose is itself an unlawful or
criminal act. The same thing is true with regard to the
exercise of the right of property. A man has the right to
give or sell his property where he will, but if he give or sell
it, or refuse to give or sell it, as a means of inducing or compelling another to commit an unlawful act, his giving or selling it, or refusal to do so, is itself unlawful." 8
' Per Taft. J., 743.

' Per Taft, J., 7.38, 739.
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In Thomas v. Chi., Ncw Orleans and Texas Pacific Ry.
Co., supra,which arose from a boycott of the Pullman Palace
Car Co., instituted by labor organizations, to carry out which
strikes were instituted on various roads to force them to
refuse to haul Pullman cars, it was held that one Phelan, a
labor leader and associate of Debs. was in contempt for inciting strikes among the men. The opinion, which is by
Taft, J., fully recognizes the right of combination and
organization, as above shown, and seems to treat the defendant as on the same basis with the striking workmen,
saying that his acts would be legal if the difficulty arose
from dissatisfaction of the men with the terms of their employment. But it is pointed out that there was no such
dissatisfaction, hence the illegality. "All the employees,"
it is said, " had the right to quit their employment, but they
had no right to combine to quit in order thereby to compel
their employer to withdraw from a mutually profitable relation with a third person, for the purpose of injuring that
third person, when the relation thus sought to be broken
had no effect on the character or reward of their service. It
is the motive for quitting and the end sought thereby that
make the injury inflicted unlawful, and the combination by
which it is effected an unlawful conspiracy," etc.
In the so-called Northern Pacific Case 9 there was a strike
among the employees of the Northern Pacific Railroad, then
in the hands of a receiver appointed by the United States
Circuit Court, on account of a general reduction of wages
made by the receiver. The Circuit Court granted an injunction in very broad terms against the workmen, enjoining
them not only from acts directly interfering with the receiver's possession of the property of the railroad, and
attempts by force, intimidation, and threats to interfere with
the employees of the road, or those seeking employment, but
also against two further classes of acts-viz.:
(I) Combining and conspiring to quit the service, with
or without notice, with the object and intent of crippling the
property and embarrassing the operation of the railroad and
'Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310 (1894).
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(2)
from so quitting the service, with or without notice,
as to cripple the property or prevent or hinder the operation
of the road.
On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals from this injunction, in which objection was made to the parts of the
injunction here numbered I and 2, but not to that which
preceded, it was held, Mr. Justice Harlan giving the opinion.
that 2 should be struck out, but I should remain. It is said
in the opinion that 2 should be struck out because you cannot
have specific performance of a contract for personal service,
and hence, even if the implied contract of railroad employees
is not to quit without notice so as to embarrass the operation
of the road, injunction is not available as a remedy. As to
I, the opinion asserts, in broad and emphatic terms, the right
of the workmen to confer together and to strike in a body on
account of the reduction of wages, without regard to its
effect upon the property or operation of the road, adding
that "their right as a body of employees affected by the proposed reduction of wages to demand given rates of compensation as a condition of their remaining in the service, was
as absolute and perfect as was the right of the receivers to
fix the rates they were willing to pay." But the opinion continues, " that is a very different matter from a combination
and a conspiracy among employees, with the object and
intent not simply of quitting the sen-ice of the receivers because of the reduction in wages, but of crippling the property
in their hands and embarrassing the -operation of the railroad," and proceeds at considerable length to support that
idea by the discussion of the law of conspiracy.
These decisions naturally suggest the question so much
discussed in Allen v. Flood-viz., whether malice may make
an act illegal which is otherwise legal. Without entering
upon a general discussion of that question, it should be noted
that there is a difference between an act which is negative
in character, which consists in not doing something, such as
ceasing to work or refusing to deal, and one which is positive
and consists in doing something. There is much less reason
for holding motive or malice to be material in the former case
than in the latter. Can motive then be material as affecting
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the right to stop work or leave ant employment? We should
say plainly not. There is no more duty to continue in an
employment, when the contract of service does not require
it.than to enter the employment originally. There is no
such duty in either case on the part of the workman, unless
there is a corresponding right on the part of the employer to
the services of the workman. To assert such right is simply
to introduce slavery. If there is anything axiomatic in the
law, therefore, it is the right to leave an employment for a
good reason, a bad reason, or no reason. The contrary view
appears to us most surprising, and we cannot think that it
will ever gain currency.
If motive were material in case of refusing services as
a laborer, there would be no reason for confining the doctrine
to that class of cases; it would apply equally to other negative acts. Suppose, then, that a person, or several persons
acting in conjunction with each other, refuse to make their
customary contribution to the support of a clergymen, and
he is obliged to resign in consequence, is it admissible to
inquire into their motives for such refusal, and may they
incur legal liability if their motives are adjudged not good?

The question answers itself.

It is also answered by an

actual decision,1 0 in the negative of course.

In short, the

doctrine asserted by the learned Federal judges seems to be
purely socialistic.
Referring further to the cases in which it is announced, it
seems that in the first of them,-viz., Toledo, etc., R. R. Co.
v. Pa. Co.,-the interstate commerce ac has no real bearing
on the case. In the first place, the act of striking would not
probably cause the railroad company to violate its obligations
under the act, for the law would not hold the company in
default for not handling freight when it could not get men
to do the work. In the next place, even if this were otherwise, the interstate commerce law does not, any more than
the common law, require men to continue in an employment
in order to enable the employer to fulfil his obligations. As
to the further idea advanced by the learned judge, that with" Kcarney v. Lloyd, 26 L. R. Ir. 268 (i8go).
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holding one's labor or property may be unlawful in some
cases, because it may operate to cause the person denied to
commit an unlawful or criminal act, this is certainly a novel
suggestion. Does he mean that, if I refuse alms to a beggar,
who thereupon is driven by wvant to steal, I am liable civilly
or criminally? There m:ght be a great moral responsibility
in such a supposed case, but, unless the law is to usurp the
whole field of morals, no legal responsibility; which leads
us to remark that the judges in the cdses under discussion
seem to have assumed the role of teachers of morals rather
than of law, with results which might well be questioned,
even on moral grounds.
In the opinion in Thonzas v. Cinn., N. and T. P. Ry. Co.,
the judge thinks inciting the strike illegal because there was
no dissatisfaction among the men with the terms of their employment. This leads us to inquire as to what may be considered dissatisfaction. The men wanted the road to stop
hauling Pullman cars. They may have had a good reason
for asking that, or they may not have had. At all events,
they demanded it as a condition of continuing in the employment, failed to get it, and hence struck. How can it be said
that they were not dissatisfied with the terms of their employment?
The views expressed by Taft, J., in both of the above
cases, in which he gave the opinion, might be considered as
not necessary to the decisions respectively, although the matter was fully considered, but that cannot be said of the conclusions of Mr. Justice Harlan in Arthur v. Oakes, where the
terms of the injunction depended on the doctrine announced.
The rule of motive is here presented in a more extreme form
than in either of the other cases, as the malicious motive was
not supposed to be the sole motive. In this case, unlike the
others, the men were dissatisfied with their waiges, the strike
arising from a reduction of wages. The idea of the learned

judge seems to be, if we are able to comprehend it, that if the
men acted from mixed motives, partly because dissatisfied
with their wages but partly also from a desire to injure the

road, their acts would be illegal, although otherwise legal.
As the opinion does not deny the right to strike and to corn-
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bine for the purpose, and admits that there was sufficient
cause if cause were needed, and that the injury to the road,
which was inevitable, did not abridge their rights in that respect, the injunction granted seem.- to say. in effect, no more
than this-viz., that the men must not, while exercising their
right to strike, harbor any ill will against the company. The
question which would be presented in case of an alleged violation of this injunction would evidently be one for a father
confessor rather than for a legal tribunal, and even he would,
we think, despair of reaching a conclusion of any value. The
question presented as the controlling issue in the case is of no
practical importance, and its consideration could only lead to
refinements of casuistry. The law does not pursue shadows.
and we cannot help regarding the decision as a vagary of
legal learning. The opinion frankly admits that the case of
the employer is parallel to that of the workman, as regards a
breach of relations. May an employer, then, be liable for
discharging a servant, without breach of contract, on account
of his motives for discharging, and may he be enjoined from
so doing? Statutes have recently been passed in some states
forbidding an employer from discharging men for such reasons as that they belong to a labor union. These statutes are
considered, and have been held to be, unconstitutional."1
It is noticeable that the feature of combination is emphasized by Mr. Justice Harlan, but that feature is eliminated in
the opinion of Taft, J., in the Ann Arbor case. As the right
of workmen to combine is so fully admitted, it is difficult to
see how that feature can have any bearing.
Contrast with the above cases the opinion of Mr. Justice
12
Brewer in the United States Circuit Court for Colorado.
There he punished for contempt certain strikers, who by demonstration of force and threats of violence, express or implied, overawed other workmen, but he took pains to explain
fully, and to dwell upon, the absolute right of the workmen
to strike peaceably and to induce their fellow-workmen to do
n Stimson, "Handbook to Labor Law," I82.

Mo. x63.
U. S. v. Kane,

23

Fed. Rep. 748 (1885).

State v. Julow,

129
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so. There is no hint that this right is affected by the question
of motive; in passing upon the different individual cases, he
does not consider whether any peaceable striker, either alone
or in combination with others, was influenced by wrong
motives. On the contrary, he says, referring to the reasons
which certain men may have for striking, and may give in
urging others to strike, " if the reasons are frivolous, that is
their business, the employer has no right to object."
The right to refuse to deal involves the right to select the
persons with whom one will deal, and to refuse to deal with
certain persons or classes, and it excludes any inquiry into
the reasons or motives of the actor or the justice of his selection. B has no claim that A shall employ him, or work for
him, or buy of him, or sell to him, and consequently it is of
no consequence why A refuses to do so. The reasons may
be foolish or frivolous, they may involve what, in a popular
and moral sense, appears to be unjust discrimination; but
no legal liability flows therefrom, because there is no legal
obligation which is violated. Personal dislike, ill-will, or
malice will not create a cause of action in such case. An
employer may choose to employ only Christians or Republicans or non-union workmen, and may discharge men already
in his employ because they are Jews or Democrats or members of labor unions. That does not give the Jews or Democrats or union workmen any legal ground of complaint.
Workmen may choose to work only in union shops, so
called. No one would claim that the right to exercise such
choice is subject to any restriction. A dealer may refuse to
sell to, or buy of, any except members of a certain association.
Such refusals to deal may involve loss and injury to the
persons refused, especially where relations previously formed
are severed, as in case of the discharge of workmen by the
employer, or strike by workmen, but that is not material.
Likewise the right to refuse to deal involves the right to
name any terms which one pleases, and to refuse to deal
except on those terms. The thing to be noted is that it does
not matter how extravagant, absurd. or unreasonable the
terms may be. If the person to whom they are offered
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doesn't like them, he need not accept. The party offering is
not bound to deal at all, and therefore may refuse to deal on
any except specified terms. In cases where the terms offered
are extravagant or in a popular sense unfair, the transaction
is often stigmatized as extortion, coercion, and blackmail, but
it should be noted that there is no extortion, coercion, or
blackmail in a legal sense in such cases. A caution on this
head is not out of place, as the use of such language is apt to
mislead, the mind unconsciously allowing such expressions
to take the place of argument. That this is not a needless
caution is shown by the frequency with which the matter has
been referred to in judicial opinions.
In Jersey City PrintingCo. v. Cassidy 13 it is said, somewhat facetiously, that, as workmen have absolute freedom to
combine, and to abstain from work, for good reasons, bad
reasons, or no reasons, and may make any conditions they
please, there is a wide field for the workman to dictate to the
employer how he shall carry on his business.
To illustrate the above, A may refuse to sell to -B at ordinary rates, or at all, unless B will agree not to retail below a
certain price, or unless B will agree to buy only of A to the
exclusion of other dealers. A is acting within his legal
rights, although the latter condition, at least, may, under
some circumstances, appear tyrannical.
Workmen mav determine to leave their employment unless the employer will agree to conduct his business in a
certain manner, or unless he will pay them a certain bonus;
they may vote that he shall pay them such bonus and call it
a fine, because he has done something that they don't like,
violated some business rule which they conceive, rightly or
wrongly, that he ought to observe, or which they want him
to observe, and determine to leave unless the so-called fine is
paid. Obviously there is nothing illegal in this. They are
merely stating the terms on which they are willing to continue in the employment. They might refuse to continue
in the employment as mere employees and insist on being
63 N. J. Eq. 759.
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made partners or severing all relations. In this no one
would say that they were not acting within their rights.
In Carew v. Rutherford,14 a 'Massachusetts case much relied upon in a later case, the facts were as follows: The plaintiff, who was in the stone-cutting business, had in his employ
twenty journeymen who were members of a local labor association, together with eight or ten unskilled laborers and four
apprentices. The association, in consequence of the plaintiff
sending certain work to New York to be done there, which
they didn't like, voted that the plaintiff should pay to the
association $5oo as a penalty. On his refusal to pay, the
journeymen left his shop in a body under the lead of two
of their number, who had told him that all the association
men in the shop would desert him at once unless he paid
the $5oo. Afterwards the plaintiff paid the $5oo to the
defendants, and the men came back to work. The action was
to recover back the $5o0 so paid, and the plaintiffs prevailed
therein. The defendants were four of the journeymen, including the two just referred to, under whose lead the men
left the shop. After the men had left and before the payment
of the money, the defendants told the plaintiff that no association men would be allowed to work in his shop if he
refused to pay the money. As the defendants here were
themselves certain of the workmen who struck, there seems
to have been nothing illegal in their conduct in reference
to the strike itself, or in demanding $5o0 as a condition of
remaining or returning to work. The only particular in
which their conduct is open to attack is in saying that no
association men would be allowed to work for the plaintiff
if he refused to pay the $5oo. Possibly that might be construed as a threat to induce other members of the association
not to enter plaintiff's employment, but that construction
seems rather strained, and it seems more natural to regard
it as merely a statement of the effect of the vote passed.
Aside from this, the defendants did nothing but exercise their
right to strike in conjunction with the other men, and to
refuse to return except on certain terms. The opinion admits
1o6 Mass. i (187o).
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the right of "any number of persons, without an unlawful
object in view, to associate themselves together, and agree
that they will not work for, or deal with, certain men or
classes of men, or work under a certain price, or without
certain conditions," and does not point out specifically what
the defendants did more than this. The conduct of the defendants is characterized as "extortion," but, as above explained, it was not extortion in any proper sense of the term.
It seems difficult to support the decision.
So, likewise, a manufacturer or dealer may refuse to sell
to another dealer unless the latter will conduct his business
in a certain manner. Dealers may associate together and
agree on certain methods of conducting business, which they
conceive to be desirable or necessary for the successful prosecution of their branch of business, and determine to deal with
no dealer who departs from their rules. Those who do not
choose to conform to requirements thus made cannot complain because the members refuse to sell to them or buy of
them, and it doesn't matter whether the rules in question are
good or bad. No question can be raised as to their fairness
or unfairness. No one is obliged to sell to another, or to buy
of him, any more than to work for him or employ him.
Cases of the above character have come before the courts in
a number of instances.
In Cote v. Murphy 15 workmen in the building trade combined to get a reduction of hours and the dealers combined
to resist, and agreed not to sell to any one who granted the
men's demands. The plaintiff, a dealer not in the combine,
having granted the men's demands, and not being able to
get building material from those in the combine, sued the
latter, claiming that they were liable for thus trying to compel
him to conform to their practice. The decision was in favor
of the defendant.
In Minnesota a similar case arose.'8 There an association
of wholesale lumber dealers agreed not to sell directly to
consumers at any points where a member of the association
is
159 Pa. St. 42o (1894).
1

"Bohns Mfg. Co. v. HoIls, 54 Minn.

223 (1893).
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had a yard, and not to sell to dealers who did otherwise.
The plaintiff having violated this rule, the secretary of the
association was about to notify the members in accordance
with the by-law of the association, and demanded that the
plaintiff should pay to the association a commission on the
sales made by him in violation of the above rule, whereupon
the plaintiff sued for an injunction and damages. It was held
that the action would not lie. The Court in the opinion
alludes to the danger of being " influenced by such terms
of illusive meaning as 'monopolies,' 'trusts,' 'boycotts,'
'strikes,' and the like," saying that the facts of the case
" involve no element of coercion or intimidation in the legal
sense;" what one may lawfulls, do, many may. combine to
do, and the defendants have done no more.
In a Rhode Island case IT an association of master-plumbers notified wholesale dealers in supplies not to sell to nonmembers on penalty of withdrawal of the patronage of the
members of the association. In an action by a dealer against
whom this notification was enforced it was held that he
could not recover, the Court in a well-considered opinion
saying, " The threats were not coercive in the legal sense; for
th-ough coercion may be exerted by the application of moral
as well as physical force, the moral force exerted by the
threat was a lawful exercise by the members of the association
of their own rights, etc."
The term or condition annexed to an offer may relate to
the offeree's relations to a third person, and that may raise
a question whether such person has any ground of complaint.
I will sell to you at reduced rates if you will stop buying
of my competitor B, I will employ you if you will stop patronizing my enemy B. Has B a cause of action? Suggestive
cases under this head have arisen in Maine,1 8 Tennessee x*
and Indiana.2 0 In the Maine case the plaintiff owned a
house, which he rented, on an island where the only possible
tenants were the workmen of the defendant. The defendant,
Macaulcy
-1
v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255 (1895).

Heywood v.Tillson. 75 Me.
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Payne v. R. R. Co., i3 Lea. 5o7 (1884).
SJackson v- Stanfield,, 137 Ind. 592 (1893).
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being at enmity with the plaintiff, gave notice that he would
not employ any man who should rent the house, and thereby
prevented the plaintiff from getting a tenant. The Court
said, in deciding for the defendant, that the fact that men
are enemies will not give a cause of action; the defendant
had a right to employ whom he chose, and " even the malicious exercise of this right would give the plaintiff no cause
of action."
In the Tennessee case a railroad company, defendant,
published notice that it would discharge any man who should
trade with a certain merchant, the plaintiff. As in the Maine
case, the Court decided in favor of the defendant, saying that
one does not render one's self liable for maliciously exercising
his rights, and announcing his intention of doing so. Two
judges, however, dissented, and argued that whenever the
exercise of a legal right is solely for the purpose of injury
to another, and such injury follows, he should respond in
damages.
In the Indiana case there was a rule of a retail dealers'
association in the lumber trade against wholesalers selling
to customers or brokers, and the rule was enforced against A,
whereby B, a broker who bought of him, was injured in
his business. It was held that B could recover against the
members of the association. It will be noticed that the facts
were very similar to the facts in Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis,
supra, except that the suit was by a third person instead of
the one directly affected. The Indiana court considers, and
disagrees with, the latter case, and characterizes the arrangement in question as "a compact to suppress the competition
of those who did not own yards, with an adequate stock on
hand, by driving them out of business. By this plan they
reach the wholesale dealer and compel him to pay an arbitrary
penalty under a threat of financial injury, and they force him
to assist in ruining the dealer who does not own a yard."
In reference to the position here taken by the court, it
seems to be the law that if a contract is in restraint of trade,
the consequence is merely that it is not enforceable; it does
not give any third person a cause of action. (Cooke on
"Trade and Labor Combinations," p. i6r.)
And inia
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recent Scotch case, 21 where an association of butchers told
cattle salesmen that they would not buy at their sales if
persons representing the Co-operative Society were allowed
to bid, and the salesmen in consequence refused to receive
bids from the Co-operative Society, it was held that the
latter society could not maintain an action against the
butchers.
It is evident from the discussion and citations so far that
great injury may be inflicted by a refusal to deal, but no
cause of action arises therefrom.
Having so far considered questions arising from refusals
to deal, which may be sometimes complicated with questions
of inducing not to deal, we now come more directly to the
latter subject. We have already noted that molestation, or
inducing not to deal, may be directed against any one in the
various relations of life, employer, workman, dealer, etc. It
may also spring from various motives, and various means
may be adopted to accomplish it. It may arise from competition, a widely operative cause, and when it does there is
no doubt that it is justified. A workman may try to get
another man's job away from him; an employer may try
to get a workman away from the employer he is working for;
a tradesman may try to get another man's customers; and,
if successful, incurs no liability to the person thus deprived
of his job, his workman, or his customer. It may arise from
some personal interest which the actor has other than coinpetition, as in case of one fellow-workman objecting to another. It may arise from interest in the public welfare, as
where one exposes a swindler, or hypocrite, or denounces an
enterprise or business as immoral, or injurious to health or
good manners. It may arise from more questionable motives,
and, finally, from malice. The means used may be actual violence, as where striking work-men drive away other workmen, or threats of such violence, or other unlawful acts, or
threats to do something which is lawful but which is injurious to the person threatened, such as a threat to strike,
Scottish Co-op., etc., Soc. v. Glasgow Fleshers' Trade Defence Asso-

cition, 35 Scottish L R. 645.
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or a threat to discharge, or a threat to withdraw one's
patronage; or the means may be ordinary persuasion, appeals
to reason or prejudice.
We may agree at the outset that, if actual violence is the
means used, liability follows. The old and much quoted
cases where the defendant was held liable for driving away
the plaintiff's customers by assaulting them, 22 and the somewhat similar case where defendant was held liable for
frightening game away from the plaintiff's decoys, 23 are instances of this. A more modem instance is where striking
workmen drive away other workmen. In practice a common
case, and one which has given rise to much litigation, is
where damages or injunction is sought for procuring the
discharge of a workman. Generally the litigation arises from
the activity of labor unions, but not always.
Thus, in a Vermont case,24 the defendant, who employed
A, who in turn employed B, being angry with B. required
A to discharge B, on pain of being himself discharged if he
did not do so; whereupon A discharged B. It was held that
B had no cause of action against the defendant, although the
defendant acted maliciously.
In an Illinois case 25 there was a decision supporting the
right of action. In that case a workman brought suit against
his employer to recover for personal injuries received. The
Accident Liability Company, in which the employer was insured, procured the latter to discharge the man, apparently
with the purpose of forcing the settlement of the suit on
favorable terms, by threatening to cancel the employer's
policy of insurance. It was held that the company was
liable for so doing.
In each of these cases the defendant sustained, although
indirectly, certain business relations to the plaintiff. In the
Vermont case the defendant may be considered to have had
an interest in the kind of men employed by A in his, the
Tarleton v. McGawley, i Peake 270 (1794).
=Keeble v. Hickeringill, ii East 574, note (i7o6).

Raycroft v. Tainter, 68 Vt. 219 (1896).
' London Guarantee, etc., Co. v. Horn, ioi Ill. App. 355.
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defendant's, work. In the Illinois case the defendant company certainly had an interest in the kind of men whom the
insured should employ, and might properly not wish to have
a man employed who had once met with an accident and
caused it loss thereby. The Vermont court apparently
thought that such interest justified the request to discharge
and precluded a consideration of other motives; but the Illinois court (not a court of last resort) thought differently.
If the cook, having had a quarrel with the butler, says to
the master, " Discharge the butler or I will leave you," and
the master discharges the butler, is that actionable? This
very question was asked by way of illustration in the famous
case of Allen v. Flood, supra, and fairly states the issue in the
class of cases to which that case belongs. An unlearned man
would find no difficulty, we surmise, in answering it. His
answer would be in the negative. But it was answered in
different ways by two at least of the different judges and
lords giving opinions in that case, Cave, J., answering it in
the affirmative and Lord Herschell in the negative.
There is one point of difference, however, between the
case supposed and the ordinary case arising from the activity
of labor unions. The cook is not a rival of the butler, and
does not want his place, whereas, in a contest between union
and non-union workmen or between members of rival unions,
one set is seeking to supplant the other. In other words, the
claim for damages is weaker in the cases usually arising for
decision than in the case supposed. Allen v. Flood, however,
should, perhaps, be excepted from this remark, as the obnoxious workmen were working in iron and not in wood at
the time of the difficulty.

In the Massachusetts and New York cases referred to at
the beginning of this article, in which the courts came to
opposite conclusions, with dissents in each case, the New
York court following the decision of the House of Lords in
Allen v. Flood and the 'Massachusetts court refusing to follow
it, the contest was in each case not between union and non-

union workmen, but between rival labor organizations.
If union workmen threaten to strike unless non-union

men, or members of a rival union, are discharged. is this
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actionable? Can the latter, if discharged, thereafter recover
damages, or, before discharge, have an injunction?
There are two independent reasons which may be urged in
support of the negative. The first is that there is nothing
unlawful in a threat to strike. The right to threaten to strike
follows from the right to strike. Threats are often spoken of,
as if all threats were alike and were on the same basis as
threats of violence. Hence the use of the term is apt to be
misleading, as we have already seen to be the case in the
use of the word " coerce" and similar expressions. But a
threat is only an announcement of intention, and, although
usually used in reference to something injurious, it may refer
to something which is lawful although injurious, and, as
said by Lord Herscliell in Allen v. Flood, supra, '"The law
cannot act differently because you choose to call it a threat
or coercion instead of an intimation or warninig." 26 One
may threaten to do what he has a right to do. Since a
workman may strike, he may announce his intention to
do so. Such an announcement has no quality which makes
it tortious. It is a, neutral act. It merely conveys information, and it may be for the benefit of all concerned that
the announcement should be made in advance, rather than
that the workman should strike without notice. In fact,
where notice of intention to leave is required by the contract, the unlawfulness would seem to be in omitting it
rather than otherwise.
The conclusion seems unavoidable, therefore, that a mere
threat to strike in a certain event does not give a cause of
action, whatever the consequence. The ground on which it
is claimed to do so is, that it is used as a means to induce
the employer to discharge the obnoxious men. As to this,
it should be said that, if the announcement or threat is not
all, if, in addition to it or in connection with it, the employer
is asked to discharge the men, or, if the announcement is not
a true statement of intention, if, in fact, those threatening to
strike do not intend to do so, but falsely represent that they
: See also remarks of Holmes, J., in Vegelahn v. Cuntner, 167 Mass.
92,

07.
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do as a means of inducing the employer to discharge the
men, then the facts make a case of inducing, but not otherwise. In practice a very slight difference in the facts, or
different constructions or versions of the general facts, would
make the difference between one case and the other. But
the defendants are entitled in every case to have the difference
recognized. In Allen v. Flood different judges put different
constructions on the testimony as bearing on this distinction,
some considering that the defendant tried to persuade the
employer to discharge the plaintiffs, others considering that
he did no more than state what would happen if the men
remained and left it entirely to the employer to decide what
course he would pursue without trying to influence him; and
the different views of the evidence thus taken have been
suggested as explaining the difference of opinion among the
27
judges in that case.
In Plant v. Woods, supra, which will presently be considered more fully, the Massachusetts court seems to have
strained the facts to make a case of inducement. The defendants there appear not even to have made any threats
expressly, but the court finds that threats should be implied
from what they did. The nearest approach to a threat was
that, when an employer asked if there would be trouble in a
certain event, the defendant did not deny it.
In Heywood v. Tillson, supra (p. 88), and Payne v.
R. R. Co., supra (p. 89), the Maine and Tennessee courts,
in cases involving a refusal to deal on the part of the employer, recognized and acted on this distinction between mere
threatening and inducing.
Speaking of inducement, an actual strike would naturally
operate more strongly than a threat of strike to cause the
employer to discharge the obnoxious men; but of course
that would not be unlawful. It seems strange that the less
effective method-viz., by threat-should be held illegal,
when the more effective is not. Lord Herschell in Allen v.
Flood, supra, refers to this point, saying that he cannot
See article in AM. LAW REG. for March, i9o3, on "Some Leading
English Cases on Trade and Labor Disputes," by \V. D. Lewis.
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understand how an action lies, because, instead28 of leaving,
there was an intimation that they would do so.

In the second place, supposing a case of inducing is made,
that is, supposing the defendants ask to have the plaintiffs
discharged, the defendants, if they are fellow-workmen with
the plaintiffs or represent fellow-workmen, are acting within
their rights, because they have an interest in who shall be
their fellows; their safety, comfort, convenience, and personal pleasure are concerned. No one would deny that a
workman, under some circumstances, would have a right to
ask for the discharge of a fellow-workman. Then how is it
to be determined when the proper circumstances exist? Who
shall say what is a good and sufficient cause for such request?
It may be a matter of taste merely. Evidently the courts
would not try the sufficiency of the cause. Hence the law
says that it will not inquire into the motives of the defendant.
The relation of the parties renders the act justifiable without
such inquiry, as in case of somewhat different relation in
Raycroft v. Tainter,supra.
Referring now to the argument in support of the affirmative 6f the question under consideration, it is that a man has
a right to pursue his calling unmolested, and the opinions
on that side deal largely in pictures of the merciless manner
in which the labor unions use their powers and the undeserved
injury inflicted by them on innocent men, their methods
being denounced as threats, coercion, compulsion, conspiracy,
etc., the position of the employer being sometimes compared
to that of a traveller, who, on a pistol being presented to his
head by a highwayman, surrenders his purse; and it is said
that their efforts to oust other workmen are made not to
benefit themselves, but to injure the others.
These arguments do not go far towards answering the
positions taken above in the negative of the question. The
right to pursue one's calling unmolested is not a general, but
a very limited, right. In the exercise by different persons of
the same rights collisions inevitably ensue, and no one is
entitled to be exempt absolutely from molestation. Compe" Per Herschell, L. J., Allen v. Flood (1898), A.C. I, 130.
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tition implies molestation.

It is therefore incumbent on

those arguing in support of the liability to answer more
specifically the positions taken in the negative, and this apparently they fail to do. All the evils which they paint
would apply equally well as an argument against the right
to strike and the right to combine. The vituperative epithets
so freely used in place of argument, when analyzed, are seen
to amount to nothing. The compulsion exercised consists
wholly in naming the terms on which alone the men are
willing to give their services, and such naming has force
only when the employer desires those services too strongly to
refuse the terms. To characterize the conduct of the workman, therefore, as compulsion involves an implication, which,
of course, is untrue, that the employer has a claim to the
workman's services. The comparison of the position of the
employer to that of a traveller stopped by a highwayman is
certainly, as said by Lord Herschell in Allen v. Flood, " gro-

tesque."
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The general charge of molestation and interference is a
two-edged sword, which may logically be turned against
them; to deny one the right to strike, to combine for the
purpose, to announce his intention to strike, to choose one s
associates, and to get another's job if possible, is itself an
interference with the rights of the workman.
Commona,ealth v. Hunt,3 0 a Massachusetts case decided
as early as 1842, in which Chief Justice Shaw gave a carefully written opinion, goes far to support the negative of the
question under consideration, and may well be studied in
connection with the recent case of Plant v. Voods, which is
on the other side of the question. In Commonwealth v.
Hunt the members of a club, or association, of boot-makers
agreed not to work for any employer who should employ
others than members of the club after notice to discharge
them, or who should employ any one who should break any
of their by-laws, unless he should pay the penalty imposed
therefor. An indictment against the members for criminal
Per Herschell, L J., Allen v. Flood (x898), A. C. I, 130.
Met. MII.
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conspiracy alleged this agreement and various acts done in
pursuance of it-e.g., that by means of such conspiracy the
defendants compelled an employer, IV, to discharge a workman, H, because H would not pay to the club a penalty for
a breach of the by-laws; that defendants conspired to impoverish H and prevent him from following his trade and
earning a livelihood, and did unlawfully prevent him from
following his trade and did greatly impoverish him; that the
defendants conspired to impoverish XW and other employers
and to hinder them from emp!oying any who should not,
after notice, become members of the club, or who should
break any of the rules and not pay the penalty therefor.
After a verdict of guilty, a motion in arrest of judgment
was sustained, Shaw, C. J., saying in substance: The manifest intent of the association is to induce all those engaged
in the same occupation to become members of it; such a purpose is not unlawful; the means to be used were not to work
for an employer who should continue to employ a non-member after notice; this is lawful; it is not criminal for men to
agree to exercise their own acknowledged rights in such a
manner as best to subserve their own interests. A fair test
is to consider the effect of such an agreement where the object of the association is acknowledged to be a laudable one;
e.g., suppose workmen agree not to work in a shop where
ardent spirits are used, or for an employer who, after notice,
should employ a workman who used them; this might make
it difficult for such a workman to get employment and might
embarrass the employer, but it would be lawful. The manner
in which W was "compelled" to discharge H-viz., by the
defendants agreeing not to work for XV-is not unlawful,
there being no contract to work for a certain time Which was
violated; the word "compel" is dis,"rmed -and rendered
harmless by the precise statement of the means by which
such compulsion was to be effected. The allegations as to
impoverishing, etc., show no unlawful acts; associations may
be entered into, the object of which is to adopt measures
that have a tendency to impoverish another, that is, to diminish his gains, and yet, so far from being unlawful, the object
may be highly meritorious and public spirited-e.g., where
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a rival baker is introduced in a small village and the price
of bread thus reduced.
This decision seems to us to be of the highest importance,
and to contain an answer to all the arguments that are
made in support of the claim of liability. Here we have a
case of combination in its extreme form, it being agreed that
the members will not work with non-members, and the
attempt being to bring all those in the trade into the association. The methods employed are those which have been
held by some to be illegal-viz., to notify the employer to discharge the obnoxious workmen; the workman is thereby
driven out of his place and the employer harassed and both
impoverished, and we have the allegation of a malicious
intent to injure. Every element is contained in the case
which has been claimed to make such conduct unlawful.
Yet the court finds nothing unlawful in it all, nothing but
the exercise of the defendants' ordinary civil rights.
Now let us compare with this the decision of the same
court in Plant v. Woods. The facts in that case were as follows: A local union of painters in Springfield tried to induce
former members, who had withdrawn and formfed another
union, to ask for reinstatement; and, with a view to compel
them to do so, voted that they were non-union men and to
notify their employers of that declaration; later voted to
strike in shops where the others were employed, if their demands were not complied with, visited the -employers and
asked the latter to request the men to sign applications for
reinstatement; when asked by some employers whether, if
the men did not rejoin the union and were retained by the
employers, it would mean loss or trouble in their business
in the nature of strikes or a boycott, they did not deny that
it might; they finally caused strikes to be instituted in some
Of the shops, and threatened, in the case of one employer, that
his place of business would be left off from a so-called fair
list published by the Central Union. The action was a suit
by the members of the new union against the members of the
old for an injunction. The master found that the defendants
intended that the employers should fear trouble in their business "in the nature of strikes or a boycott" if they failed
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to get the men to go back into the union and continued them
in their employ; that they did so fear and had reason to do
so. The court granted an injunction enjoining the defendants from (condensing the material part) interfering with
the employment of the plaintiffs by representing expressly or
impliedly to their employers that they are likely to suffer
loss or trouble in their business for employing the plaintiffs,
or by representing to persons giving contracts to said employers that they are likely to suffer loss or trouble for doing
so; or by intimidating or attempting to intimidate any emplover of plaintiffs by threats of loss or trouble in business;
or by attempting by any scheme to interfere with or prevent
any person from employing plaintiffs; and from all acts
which will tend to impede plaintiffs from securing or continuing in employment by putting any person in fear of loss or
trouble.
The ground on which the case goes, as presented in the
able and vigorous opinion of Mr. Justice Hammond, is, in
brief, that the defendants conspired to compel the plaintiffs
to join the defendants' union, using threats of strikes and
boycotts to induce the employers to discharge the plaintiffs
uiless the latter should join. The opinion describes in
graphic language the havoc which the defendants might
work, the ordeal which the employers in case of continued
strikes might have to pass through, and the injury to the
plaintiffs in that " if the defendants can lawfully perform
the acts complained of in the City of Springfield, they can
pursue the plaintiffs all over the state in the same manner
and compel them to abandon their trade or bow to the behests
of their pursuers."
The defendants in this case seem to have acted within their
rights in any view of the law. There was no request to the
employers to discharge them, no threat of a strike was volunteered; if anything was said about strike or boycott, it was
in reply to a question asked by the employer, and the report
does not show that any answer was given, merely "they did
not deny," etc. What operated as the real inducement in the
minds of the employers was not any persuasion used by the
defendants, but the facts of the situation-viz., the fact that
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they had struck in some instances and intended to strike in
others if the men did not come back. It seems idle to
infer from the otherwise colorless conduct of the defendants
threats and persuasion, and base thereon a cause of action
which would not otherwise exist. But if it is permissible to
consider that the defendants notified the employers that they
would strike if the obnoxious men were not discharged, the
case seems opposed to Conmionwealth v. Hunt. Nor does
the opinion answer satisfactorily the contentions of the defendants. These contentions are stated very fairly by Hammond, J., as follows-viz., " That a person may work for
whom he pleases; and, in the absence of any contract to the
contrary, may cease to work when he pleases, and for any
reason whatever, whether the same be good or bad; that he
may give notice in advance, with or without stating the
reason; that what one man may do several men acting in
concert may do, and may agree beforehand that they will do,
and may give notice of the agreement; and that all this
may be lawfully done notwithstanding such concerted action
may, by reason of the consequent interruption of the work,
result in great loss to the employer and his other employees,
and that such a result was intended." To this it is answered,
"In a general sense, and without reference to exceptions
arising out of conflicting public and private interests, all this
may be true," but the opinion fails to enlighten us as to what
those exceptions are, and thus abandons the argument at the
vital point. In the citation of authorities the opinion relies
largely on Cqrcw v. Rutherford, supra, a case which we have
already given reasons for doubting.
In National, etc., Association of Steam Fitters, etc., v.
Cummings, supra, the facts were very similar to the facts in
Plant v. Woods, supra; there was, as in that case, a contest
between rival labor organizations, and members of the defendant union threatened to cause a strike unless members of
the plaintiff union were discharged, and threatened to prevent members of the plaintiff union from getting any work,
except a certain limited class of small jobs, by ordering a
general strike against the plaintiff union wherever its members were at work. The majority opinion-by Parker, C. J.,
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deciding in favor of the defendant, takes the ground that
motive in such cases is not material, or, if material, still
no cause of action is shown, and makes substantially the
points above outlined, while the minority take the ground
that *the object of the defendants was not to get better terms
for themselves, but to prevent others from following their
lawful calling, and that their purpose and methods were
unlawful.
The New Jersey case of New Jcrsey Printing Co. v. Cassi y, supra, fully recognizes and asserts the right of union
workmen to threaten to strike unless non-union men are discharged.
Although the English and New York courts seem to support the rights of workmen to procure the discharge of other
workmen, there are two cases in those jurisdictions respectively which are on the opposite side of the question, and
which further hold that an agreement made in advance by
the employer and the defendant workman as to whom he
will employ will not justify their action.3 1
In the former case an ale brewers' association in the city
of Rochester agreed with the local union that all employees
of the breweries which belonged to the association should be
members of the union, and that no employee should be
retained more than four weeks who did not join. The
Court, in a per curiam opinion, treats such agreement as contrary to public policy. This case seems to present substantially the same question that arose and was decided the other
way in Commonwealth v. Hunt, supra-viz., the right to
combine and agree not to work with non-union men.
In the English case, which was in the Court of Appeals,
the employer and his workmen were all members of a society
-whichhad certain rules about the employment of apprentices.
Upon a disputed question as to the construction of such rules,
the society demanded that a certain apprentice should be discharged, and threatened to call out the men if that were not
done. Thereupon, the apprentice was discharged, the em"Curran v. Galen, x52 N. Y. 33 (1897) ; Read v. Friendly Soc. of,
etc., Stone Masons (i902), 2 K. B. 732:
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ployer thereby breaking a contract with him. In a suit by
the discharged apprentice against the members of the union,
it was held that the defendants were liable, and that the
by-law, regarded as a contract between the employer and the
union, was not a defence because of the means used-viz.,
threats and coercion. The conduct of the defendants is
characterized in one of the opinions, in which a second judge
concurred, as "taking the law into their own hands and
compelling the opposing litigant by coercion to give effect to
their view of a disputed obligation by breaking his contract
with the plaintiff." A third opinion takes the ground that
the construction put on the contract by the defendants was
wrong.
These two cases suggest the remark that a contract between
employer and workmen as to whom the former shall employ
would certainly justify the latter in objecting to the employment of persons contrary to the terms of the contract,-if the
contract were not against public policy. The contract in the
English case was not claimed to be against public policy. If
the construction put on it by the defendants was right, it
is difficult to see how they could be liable to the apprentice for
insisting on the employers carrying it out and threatening to
strike if that were not done. The case, therefore, could not
properly be decided against the defendants without going
into the merits of the question as to the proper construction
of the contract, and the case can only stand, if at all, on the
ground taken by the third judge.
In the class of cases last considered the workman, if he
induced the employer at all, did so in the exercise of his right
to choose his associates. Coming now to the cases outside of
this class, to the matter of inducing generally, we note that
the workman, in his attempt to bring the employer to terms,
whether in regard to wages or the employment of non-union
men or otherwise, instead of merely striking or threatening
to strike, sometimes resorts to the weapon made familiar tU
us by the practice of the labor unions, known as the boycott;
that is, he induces others not to deal with the employer, not to
buy of him or sell to him or handle his goods or work for
him. Is this lawful? It is interference with the employer's
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business, and we assume, therefore, that it must be justified
or it is not lawful. The defences made in the class of cases
last considered do not apply here.
In Allen v. Flood, supra, Lord Hersclell asked, arguendo,
"Is competition the only permissible form of interference?
Is a temperance crusade unlawful?" The question is very
suggestive. A may persuade the customers of a liquor dealer
to stop dealing with him because A considers the use of intoxicating liquors injurious or immoral, or may persuade the
patrons of a Christian Science practitioner to desert her on
the ground that Christian Science (so-called) is a delusion.
In like manner, members of a community may induce persons
not to buy of a certain dealer, B. because they think he does
not deserve to be patronized; B may be an immoral man,
or may not sell satisfactory goods, or his prices may be too
high, or he may not treat his employees well, or he may be
miserly or uncharitable. How is it to be determined whether
inducing customers in such cases to withdraw or withhold
their patronage is justified or not? Does it depend on
whether the complaint made regarding B is well foi .,ded or
not? If so, it would be necessary to try a variety of novel
questions-e.g., whether the use of intoxicating liquors is
immoral, whether Christian Science is a good thing, whether
B's prices are too high, or whether he treats his employees
well or ill. Evidently such issues -would not be deemed
material; matters of that sort are matters of opinion, and
the widest latitude must be allowed for difference of opinion
and the free expression of it. So long as A acts in good
faith and does not lie about B, A has a right, it would seem,
to appeal to the public not to trade with B. It is held in
Massachusetts that one who by his advice induces a woman
to leave her husband is not liable to the husband for alienating
the affections of the wife if the defendant acts in good
faith.32 To make a case it must appear that the advice was
not given honestly but from malevolent motives. As said by
Holmes, J., "A married woman must be supposed to be
capable of receiving advlce'to separate from her husband,

I Tasker v.Stanley,

153 Mass. I48.
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without losing her reason or responsibility." So the public
must be considered capable of judging for itself regarding
advice or appeals to it in matters of trade and business.
Returning to the relation of employer and workman, suppose an employer oppresses his workmen by harsh treatment
or the payment of insufficient wages; may not the oppressed
workman appeal to the public or to individuals not to favor
the employer with their patronage or services? In many
cases the law has stepped in and compelled employers to correct abuses in the treatment of workmen. It would be
strange if, in like case, the workman would have no right
to appeal to public or private opinion for such assistance as
it might render by showing its displeasure in a practical way.
If one may induce people not to deal with another on grounds
of general public interest, as in the instances supposed in the
last paragraph, a fortiori it may be done where the person
inducing has an immediate personal interest, as in this case.
If the right then exists for the workman in a proper case
to bring influences to bear on the employer through the
channels of his business relations, how shall it be determined
what is a proper case and what is not? We have supposed a
case where the workman is plainly entitled to our sympathy.
The case may be one where the workman is not entitled to
our sympathy-e.g., where the workman is well paid and
demands extravagant wages; or there may be room for difference of opinion as to whether he is or not--e.g., where
his only complaint is that the employer employs non-union
men. If we make the right depend on the character of the
cause, evidently we have got to try questions of economicse.g., what in a given instance are fair wages, etc. This consideration leads to the conclusion that the right in question
should not be restricted at all, or at least only by bad faith.
To put it in another way, you cannot cut off the right to
induce, the right to influence people's action, in trade and
industrial matters, without cutting it off in a large class of
cases where it would be unjust to do so; hence it should
not be cut off at all. In fact, the right to .combine, which is
generally admitted, really involves the right to induce; and
the right to give friendly advice and to free expression of
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upinion, which, as we have seen, is reserved in the cases on
the subject, really leaves no room for the operation of the
alleged rule against inducing. Even the right to compete
may be thought to involve the right to induce generally, since
getting trade away from one is merely getting it for another,
and what one may do for himself others may do on his
behalf.
A workman has a right, therefore, in case of a controversy
with his employer, to induce others in various relations to the
employer to assist him, other workmen by refusing to enter
or continue in the employ, customers and dealers by refusing
to deal, etc.
It must be admitted, however, that there is more authority
against this view than in favor of it, it being generally held
that the boycott is illegal.3 3
In these cases sometimes the controversy arises simply
from an attempt by the union to unionize a shop-i.e., to
require the employer to employ only union workmen. 3 4
In other cases from something else-e.g., in Brace Bros.
v. Evans. it arose from the discharge of certain female
operatives in a laundry, and the refusal of the employer, on
request of the other workmen, to take them back. The defendants issued circulars giving their version of the difficulty and appealing to the public to withhold its patronage;
representatives of the defendants also visited the defendants!
customers and agents to persuade the forner to stop patronizing and the latter to resign, other acts of a less defensible
kind were done. such as denouncing agents who would not
resign and calling on the public to boycott them; also picketing and carrying of banners and other dramatic public performances.
In Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., supra, the workmen in a
barrel factory objected to their company making machine'Casey v. CincinnatiTypo. Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 135 (i89i) ; Crump
v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927 0 888); Brace Bros. v. Evans, 35 Pitts.
L- J- 399; 3 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 561; Barr v. Essex Trades Council,
53 N. J. Eq. iox: Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. Rep. 912
(1897); Beck v. Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497 (898).
"Casey v. Cinn. Typo. Union, supra; Crinp v. Corn.; Beck v.
Tcamsters' Pro. Union.
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hooped barrels, and appealed to the trade and the public not
to buy them, and not to buy goods packed in them.
In Bacr v. Essex Trades Council, supra, a newspaper was
boycotted because it used plate matter, the defendants issuing
circulars and other publications containing appeals and
threats.
In Beck v. Teamsters' Piotectire Union, supra, a circular
was issued appealing to all people who believed in living
wages and fair treatment of employees to let the plaintiffs and
their product alone.
The object sought by the workmen in most of these cases
may not enlist our sympathy, but it is not apparent why they
should be prevented from arguing their case before the public.
In a case like Brace Bros. v. Evans, where the dispute arose
-,'zr the discharge of certain employees, it might easily happen that the public would be interested in knowing the facts,
in order to form an opinion as to the treatment received by
the employees. To grant the sweeping injunctions granted
in these cases, or some of them, covering plain statements of
fact (not alleged to be false) and appeals founded on such
statements, seems to be a violation of the right of free speech,
and such ground is taken by Caldwell, J., in a strong dissenting opinion in Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., supra, in
which he reviews the history of the struggle in the English
courts for free speech, commenting on the oppressive exercise
of their powers by the English judges. He concludes with
the proposition, which seems to us correct, that "whether
organized labor has just grounds to declare a strike or boycott is not a judicial question. They are labor's only
weapons, and they are lawful and legitimate weapons; and
so long as in their use there is not force or threats of violence, or trespass upon person or property, their use cannot
be restrained."
In the Massachusetts case of Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167
Mass. 92, in which an injunction was granted in a picketing
case, and Field, C. J., and Holmes, J., dissented on the
ground that the terms of the injunction were too broad in
covering more than physical obstruction and threats of physical violence, Field, C. J., says. in the course of his dissenting

TIE LAW OF STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS.

opinion, " I am not convinced that to persuade one man not
to enter into the employment of another, by telling the truth
to him about that other person and his business, is actionable
at common law, whatever the motive may be. In the present
case, if the establishment of a patrol is merely a peaceful mode
of finding out the persons who intend to go to the plaintiff's
premises to apply for work, and of inforning them of the
actual facts of the case in order to induce them not to enter
into the plaintiff's employment, in the absence of any statute
relating to the subject, I doubt if it is illegal and I see no
ground for issuing an injunction against it." The dissenting
opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes in this case and in Plant v.
Woods assert the right of organized labor, in case of a contest with an employer, to use persuasion and any means not
in themselves unlawful to induce persons not to deal with the
employer. 'o extract from these opinions would do justice
to them.
Lord Herschell says, in .4llen v. Flood. "A man has a
right to say what he pleases, to induce, to advise, to exhort, to
command, provided he does not slander or deceive or commit
any other of the wrongs known to the law of which speech
may be the medium." 35
People have a right to choose where they will bestow their
favors, to prefer one to another in business and industrial as
well as other matters. Having such right, is it not strange
that one may not address another and discuss with him
how he shall exercise that right, discuss the comparative
merits of different dealers or employers, and say that one is
worthy and another unworthy? It seems plain that, under
the guise of protecting persons against interference in their
business, the law is restricting the right of free speech and
free discussion. The right of free speech implies the right
to influence persons as to how they shall exercise their legal
rights. If a person thinks that it is important for the welfare
of the laboring man that all workmen should be organized
into unions, and that all contracts between workmen and employers should be made by collective bargaining, he has a
(i898) A. C. T38, per Herschell, L J.
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right to such opinion, however much others may differ from
him; he has a right to propagate that view, and a right to
induce all persons, consumers and workmen, to act on it by
dealing only with union shops.
In the class of cases we have just been considering, A,
having some fault to find wvith B, seeks to induce C not to
,deal with B. Now, going a step farther, if C is not persuaded to sever'or avoid relations with B, A may'seek to
induce D and E not to'deal with C. Is this lawful? C is
not a party to the original controversy, and may therefore
say-that he should not suffer for B's fault, that he should
not be made a victim of a controversy between others. This
contention has some force, but, on the other hand, A may say
that, in conducting a canvass against B, he may rightfully
iiclude B's associates and allies. B may be a slave-holder or
a liquor'dealer, or an unjust and tyrannical master; we will
therefore appeal to the public not only to withhold their
favors from him, but also from those having business relations with him, the more effectually to avoid giving any support to his business. The latter argument. it is submitted.
'should prevail, and the question be answered in the affirmative. The justification may not seem so strong and clear
perhaps as in the former class of cases, and the right asserted
Smay seem a little fainter, but it does not seem doubtful.
Again we say that, when one person has a right to choose one
of two courses, another has a right to address him, to argue
the matter, and to request him to choose one course rather
than the other. Any law which forbids this violates the
rights of both persons. The law does not put a ban on the
communication of ideas between responsible human beings.
No one has such a claim on the custom, patronage, or services
of another, in the absence of contract, that he can say to third
persons, "You must not influence, or seek to influence, that
other." In other words, the position that one is entitled to
the benefit of his enterprise, skill, and credit, and therefore it
is unlawful interference to induce others not to deal with him,
has, when examined, no sound reason to support it, except,

at least, as applied to cases of purely malicious interference.
The decided cases, however, are opposed to this view, as
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in the class of cases last considered. In fact, the authorities
make no distinction between the two classes. It is the boycott in general that is condenied. Moore v. Bricklayers'
Union, a decision made by judge Taft, in the Superior Court
of Cincinnati,. 6 is a good type of this class of cases. In
that case a bricklayers' union, which was one of the defendants, required Parker Bros., who were contracting bricklayers, to pay the fine of a certain workmankand also to discharge a certain apprentice and reinstate another, and, on
their refusal to do so, declared a boycott of Parker Bros.,
and employed a member of the union, one McElroy, one of
the defendants, to enforce it. A circular was issued requesting a withdrawal of patronage from Parker Bros., saying
that they were discriminating against union labor and
threatening to boycott any disobeying. The plaintiff, Moore,
ignoring this, sold to Parker Bros., whereupon McElroy, by
authority of the union, sent out a circular saving, " Members
of the un-on will not use materials supplied by Moore," the

effect of which was loss of customers by Moore. The argument of the defendants apparently treats the case as one of
refusing to deal rather than inducing others not to deal, relying on the propositions that one may dispose of his labor as
he pleases, may refuse to work for persons using the material
of a certain dealer, may announce his intention to do so,
many may combine to do these things, the members of the
union had a right to refuse to work for any one using Moore's
lime, and had a right to announce their intention to do so
and to combine to do both. Taft, J., states this argument,
and, in reply, says that it assumes two things, both of which
he denies-viz., that motive is immaterial and combination
legal. It is actionable, he continues, for dealers to combine not
to sell to Parker Bros. simply to injure Parker Bros., and the
same as to the customers of the plaintiff. The judge, however, finally rests his decision for the plaintiff on the ground
that the defendants scared the plaintiff's customers away, and
that there were no relations between the plaintiff and the defendant to justify it. In the course of the opinion it is said,
."7 Ry. and Corp. L. J. io8 (iM89).
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"The immediate motive of the defendants here was to show
to the building world what punishment and disaster necessarily followed defiance of their demands. The remoter motive of wishing to better their condition by the power so
acquired will not, as we think we have shown, under the
circumstances of the present case, make any legal justification
for the defendants' acts."
In Temperton v. Russell,37 which is similar to the last case,
Esher, L. J., in the Court of Appeals says that the defendants
were "not actuated by spite or malice towards the plaintiff
personally in the sense that their motive was the desire to
injure him, but they desired to injure him in his business in
order to force him not to do what he had a perfect right
to do."
Quinn v. Leathern, sitpra, is different from Moore v. Bricklayers' Union and Temperton v. Russell in that the plan to
boycott C for refusing to deal with the obnoxious party B
did not go farther than threats, as C, in that case, gave in and
stopped buying of B. C therefore had no cause of action,
but the action was brought by B. If it was lawful to boycott C, it was lawful to threaten to do so, and thus it appears that Quinn v. Leathen, and cases like it, may properly
be considered as belonging to the same class as Moore v.
Bricklayers' Union.
It is vaguely said in Quinn v. Lcathern and other cases
that, even if one has a right to induce third persons not to
deal with another, he has no right to do so by threats. The
answer is, It depends on what the threats are, on whether
it would be lawful to do what is threatened; if it would be,
then the threats are lawful, otherwise not.
The main line of argument in support of the action, in the
inducing or boycott cases, is essentially the same as that used
in all the preceding classes of cases which we have considered in this article. It is the same as that used in the
cases where it was attempted to restrict the right to strike,
and other mere refusals to deal, the same as that used in deiiying the right to threaten to strike, the burden of it being
T(1893) 1 Q. B. 715.

THE LAW OF STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS.

that the acts complained of are a conspiracy to injure and
ruin the plaintiff by inducing customers or servants not to
deal with or work for him and that this is done by threats
and compulsion, which are likened to driving away customers
by force.
This is rather the suggestion or coloring of an argument
than the logic of one; not objectionable, but not sufficient in
itself. It needs to be analyzed to test it. \re have seen how
misleading it is to talk of threats and compulsion. When
the cook, taking the opportunity when her services cannot
well be dispensed with, threatens to leave unless her pay is
raised, it is a very effective threat and savors strongly of
compulsion, but no one would say it is unlawful conduct on
her part. When an employee makes himself so indispensable
to his employer that the latter is ready to make him a partner
rather than part with him, and the employee takes advantage
of that situation to demand a partnership, you have threats
and compulsion not unlike those used by labor unions which
vote to fine employers and indulge in other fantastic performances, relying on the fact or hope that the services of
the men are so necessary that the employer will yield. This
is the kind of compulsion described by Hammond, J., in Plant
v. Wood, supra, and of which he says that "restraint of the
mind, provided it be such as would be likely to force a man
against his will to grant the thing demanded, and actually has
that effect, is sufficient," 38 and which is likened by some to
presenting a pistol at a traveller's head and demanding his
purse.
The argument fails to take note of what may be done lawfully by the use of strategy, especially by taking advantage
of the power of combination, and so finds something illegal
in the exercise of a certain power because it results in advantage to one side and disadvantage to the other. The fact
that the argument is used and applies in cases where it is
plainly unfounded, as in cases involving only a refusal to
deal, as distinguished from inducing not to deal, goes far to
discredit it. It proves too much. Furthermore, it is not
a x76 Mass. 502, per Hammond, J.
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apparent what the limits of the doctrine asserted are. When
is inducing, interference, justifiable, and when not? Competition is admitted to be one exception, and of course it is
a large one. Are there others? The struggle to make an
advantageous bargain is akin to competition. If I can keep
other workmen away, I can bring the employer to terms,
says the striking workman. Is it not permissible for him to
do that, if possible without resorting to violence or fraud? Is
this another exception? In trade competition there seems
to be no limit to the strategy which may be used and which
may result in ruining a competitor. The principal weapon
which the workman uses is his right to bestow or withhold
his labor where he Wxill. It seems difficult to deny to one
workman, or body of workmen, the right to apply to other
workmen to assist them by the use of this weapon. This is
the strategy of the industrial worker. That it is powerful
arises simply from the demand for his services, and, as no
one has a claim on his services, he cannot justly be prevented
from taking advantage of that demand in any way which is
open.
The views expressed by eminent authorities above cited,
sustaining the right to induce, seem to be supported by the
better reason, and we cannot think that the array of decided
cases on the other side has settled the question finally.
In many opinions, in the various classes of cases considered
in this article, there lurks the idea, sometimes openly stated,
as by Taft, J., in Moore v. Bricklayers' Union, supra, and
by Air. Justice Harlan in Arthur v. Oakes, supra, that combination "is an element which may furnish a cause of action

not otherwise existing.
In Barr v. Essex Trades Council, supra, a somewhat novel
view is suggested. It is said, referring to defendants' argument, " It loses sight 0f the combination, the whole strength
of which lies in the fact that each individual has surrendered
his own discietion and will to the direction of the accredited
representatives of all the organizations. He no longer uses
his own judgment but, by entering into the combination,
agrees to be bound by its decree."
It is important, therefore, to inquire what the law is on
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this point. We have already seen that the right of workmen
to organize and act together in striking and other matters
has been so full- recognized that it could hardly be questioned
at the present day. In addition to this it has been laid down
over andoover again by those on both sides of the questions
here discussed that what one may do, many may do, and
may combine to do: that there can be no conspiracy to do a
lawful act.3 9
As was said by Mr. Justice Brewer in United States v.
Kane, supra, " It is well to come down to simple things,
that which is true in these simple matters, where there is a
little piece of property and a single owner and a single
laborer, is just as true where there is a large property, a large
number of employees, and a corporation is the owner."
If there is any common law rule against a combination to
do a lawful thing, it is not apparent what it is, and the
authorities contain no clear statement about it. The halfexpressed idea to that effect in the cases on the present subject seems to be merely a survival from the old tyrannical
decisions which treated a strike as a criminal conspiracy to
raise wages.
A final word on malice and motive. It has not seemed to
us that it was necessary to determine generally 'the place of
malice in the law of torts in order to answer the questions
considered herein. But it may be useful to refer briefly to
the subject.
The instances usually cited to show that malice-i.e.. express malice-may make a tort where one does not otherwise
exist are malicious prosecution and the case of privileged
communication in libel; to these may be added misrepresentation as akin thereto in requiring intention to deceive.
These instances, at least the first two mentioned, are ex'Commonw calth v. Hunt, 4 Met. III, 130; Carew v. Rutherford.
io6 Mass. I, 14; Vcgelahn v. Guntncr, 167 Mass. 92, 1O7, Io8, per
Holmes, J.; May v. Wood, 172 'Mass. 1I, 13, and cases there cited;
Plant v. lV oods, 176 Mass. 492, 504. per Holmes, C. J.; Bohn Mfg. Co.
v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223; Macaulcy v. Tierney, i9R. I. 255, 264; Huttcy
v. Simmons (I898), I Q. B. 181, 184, per Darling, J.; Boyer v. Western Union, 124 Fed. Rep. 246, per Rogers, J.
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plained by those on the other side as instances where there
is the grant of a conditional privilege: one may prosecute
another if he does so in good faith; one may, under circumstances making a case of privilege, say what turns out to
be false of another if it is done in good faith; but in either
case the privilege is forfeited by bad faith. In answer to
this position it is said that, nevertheless, it is the element of
malice that, in the given circumstances, creates a cause of
action. What then is the real significance of the instances
put? They all relate to liability for false statements, and it
has to be determined what degree of fault is necessary to
create liability therefor. It may be held that the falsity of
the statement is in itself sufficient, as in case of unprivileged
libel; or, on the other hand, that there is no liability unless
there is intentional misstatement or malice, as in deceit, or
malicious prosecution, or privileged libel; or it may be
held that negligence is sufficient; there is a present tendency towards adopting negligence as the standard in deceit
and privileged libel. In all these instances the foundation
of the liability is the falsity of the statement. The wrong
is in making such a statement to the injury of the person
to whom it is made or about whom it is made. They seem
to afford, therefore, no foundation for generalizing as to
malice, and it cannot be argued therefrom with any force
that if one is actuated by malice in doing what ordinarily
he has a right to do, his conduct becomes actionable.
Generally speaking, it seems true that the law makes an
act legal or illegal without regard to the motive which
prompts it. A man may do all sorts of things, which are
perfectly legal, from an improper or malevolent motive. As
is said by Mr. Stimson in his book on "Labor in its Relation to Law," p. 83: "An individual, by himself, as every
melodrama tells us, may ruin another, may ruin him even
with malice aforethought, without the laws interfering to
prevent it in the least degree." Probably the reason of this
is that the search into inner motives is too difficult and
uncertain for the law generally to undertake, and it therefore seeks external standards. As said by Field, J., in
Vegclahn v. Guntcr, supra (p. io6), "When one man
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orally advises another not to enter into a third person's
employment, it would, I think, be a dangerous principle to
leave his liability to be determined by a jury upon the
question of his malice or want of malice, except in those
cases where the words spoken were false." Moreover, it is
important that legal rules shall be of general application.
Motive tends to uncertainty, and would make the same act
under the same circumstances legal in one person and illegal
in another.
The cook in my kitchen may leave my service from spite
and cause me great inconvenience, but she is not liable in
damages for doing so. I cannot sue a man who sets up in
business near me, and allege that he does it out of spite.
There are some instances, however, where the act done is
so plainly characterless, except as an exhibition of spite and
a desire to injure, that the law might not improperly forbid
it, and legislation has sometimes done this, as witness the
acts of legislature against spite-fences, so-called. If a landowner builds a fence of such kind that if can be of no benefit
to the premises, and is evidently put up merely to damage his
neighbor's premises, it seems just that the general right of
property should yield and the act be declared illegal. Now
this principle might be extended indefinitely, and then we
should have a system of law making motive a test of legality.
A land-owner may just as well put up a tenement house or
a factory to injure his neighbor, and do it more effectually in
that way, as a fence. But probably such a case would not
come within the statutes as usually framed. This legislation,
therefore, seems to emphasize the fact that motive is usually
immaterial. Conservative legislation would hesitate to extend the statute in question to the case of a factory or tenement house because the character of the building involves no
suggestion of malice, as it does in case of a fence abnormally
high, and it would be dangerous to leave it open to proof
by other evidence that the motive was malice. Plainly the
charge of malice would not be listened to in such a case independently of statute, and it seems safe to conclude that,

generally speaking, malice does not give a cause of action,
except by legislation and in the few instances of defamation,
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etc., which have a special explanation. Least of all should
the law, in cases of mixed motives, allow an issue as to which
was the dominant motive. In the struggle between labor and
capital, each striving for the advantage, as in the struggle
between capital and capital, passions are engendered that
doubtless lead the contestants at times to think more of injuring their opponents than of benefiting themselves, but the
legality of their conduct must surely be tested by general considerations, arising from the relations of the parties, and like
matters, and not by the quality of the motives in any particular instance. In a contest involving strikes and boycotts, one
man, who is of low instincts, may act principally from motives of revenge; another, who is high-minded, from a desire
to elevate himself and his fellow-workmen. Is the same act
legal in one, and illegal in the other? Plainly not. They
have a right to do it or not, and the motive of the individual
is not material. Motive, in a general sense, may be material
to this extent-viz., in determining whether the act shall be
held to be legal, we inquire whether there may be a good
reason for it, and, if there may be, we conclude that the law
should permit it. This is, in effect, the mode of reasoning
adopted by Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Hunt,
supra.
There may be a good reason why workmen should induce
other workmen not to enter or remain in the employ of a certain employer, or induce customers not to deal with him, or
why workmen should request the discharge of other workmen, or why generally persons 5hould be induced to exercise
their rights as to dealing with others in a certain way. Hence
inducing generally should be permitted.
In Allen v. Flood, supra, Lord Chancellor Halsbury, although he dissented from the decision and held that the defendants should be held liable, evidently considered motive,
except in the general sense, immaterial; for he said that the
instructions to the jury were too favorable to the defendants
in leaving to the jury the question of motive; that the
defendants should be held liable even if they acted in good
faith. 40 And, in thecases generally. when it is said that the
(1898)

A. C. i, 83, per Halsbury, L. C.
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defendants act from a desire to injure the plaintiffs and not
from a desire to benefit themselves, there is no inquiry into
actual motives, the statement refers rather to the tendency
and effect of the acts. The question of actual motive or
malice is thus really ignored as fully as by those who say
that it is not material.
The conclusion seems to follow that the rights of the parties
depend on other considerations than actual motive, and that
the basis on which we have argued the matter leaves no
further question open.
Charles R. Darling.
Boston, Mass.

